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Problems regarding multinational companies have been growing
in both complexity and world interest. The study of the political,
social, economic and cultural aspects of multinational companies has
been undertaken by various international forums. The United Nations
Organization, through its General Assembly' and several specialized
agencies, such as the Economic and Social Council2 (ECOSOC) and
the International Labor Organization, 3 has published important papers
and reports on this matter. Within the regional scope, the Organization
of American States4 (OAS) and the European Economic Community5
(EEC) have approached the problem from a different perspective. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 6 the
* Professor, National University of Mexico City; President, National Federation
of Mexican Bar Associations.
1. The United Nations General Assembly, through resolution 2928 of November
1972, requested governments and international organizations to supply all possible
information concerning the legal problems presented by the different kinds of multinational enterprises and the implications thereof for the unification and harmonization of
international trade law. G.A. Res. 2928, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30). 114, U.N. Doc.
A/8730 (1972).
2. U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Impact of Multinational
Corporations on the Development Process and on International Relations, U.N. Doc.
E/5500/Rev. I., ST/ESA/6. (1974). The Multinational Corporations in World Development, U.N. Doc. ST-ECA/190 (1973).
3. International Labor Organization, The Multinational Enterprises and the Social
Policy, New Series No. 79 (1973).
4. Organization of American States, El Marco Juridico de las Empresas Transnacionales, OEA/SER. K/XXI., CIDIP/2, (1973); Organization of American States, La
Estrategia de las Corporaciones Internacionales y el Sistema Juridico de los Estados: La
Experiencia Latinoamericana, CIDIP/4, (1974); Organization of American States, Estudio Comparativo de las Legislaciones Latinoamericanas Sobre Regulaci6n y Control
de la Inversi6n Privada Extranjera, OEA/SER.G. CP/Int. 680/75 (1975).
5. European Economic Council, Proposed Statute for the European Company, 3
European Comm. Bull. No. 8 (Supp. 1970). European Economic Council, Multinational
Undertaking and Community Regulations, 6 European Comm. Bull., (Supp. S15/73
1973).
6. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Investing
in Developing Countries, No. 27655 (1970) and No. 30755 (1972); Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Guide On Restrictive Business Practices, Vol. 6, No. 31885 (1973).
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United Nations Conference for Trade and Development7 and the Instituto para la Integraci6n de la America Latina, 8 also have tackled this
particular subject. Each of the foregoing studies, however, has approached the subject of multinational companies with a specialized
focus. Not only the reports submitted by these international agencies,
but also essays rendered by other institutes of scientific research,
highlight the advantages and disadvantages of transnational investment
from an economic, political or labor point of view. The social impact
of such transnational investments is emphasized, but an analysis of the
matter within a legal framework is avoided or barely touched upon.
One could conclude logically that the jurists are lagging behind
the politicians and economists and, consequently, lawyers have not
made a significant contribution in this field. Such an assertation is
understandable for legal minds have abstained from participating in
this debate due to a lack of solid grounds. The jurist, in fact, has felt as
though he were moving in quick sand. In order to avoid this quagmire,
a new compass is necessary which will enable the jurist to analyze the
recent phenomena, which clearly are beyond traditional legal
frameworks regarding the treatment of foreign investment. Thus, if we
assume that we are stepping on unexplored terrain when we tackle the
problems, any attempt to suggest adequate solutions in this murkey
area constitutes a worthwhile endeavor.
The law, by its very essence, is a dynamic discipline and, as it
evolves, it endeavors to capture socio-economic phenomena which are
changing continually in both time and space. Realistically, then, our
initial attempts to insert a legal analysis into this area may be incomplete. The theme is so new and complex that only the utmost perseverance at the domestic and international levels will yield an adequate
perspective. Nevertheless, it is hoped that these initial attempts will
spark further efforts of more depth and substance.
Since the end of the Second World War, transnational enterprises
(TNEs) have experienced a spectacular performance in the foreign
7. United Nations Conference in Trade and Development, (UCTAD), Private
Foreign Investment in its Relationship to Development, TD/134 (1971).
8. Instituto para ]a Integraci6n de ]a America Latina (INTAL) El Regimen Legal
de las Sociedades An6nimas en los Paises de ALALC (1971); Estudio de la Legislaci6n
Aplicable a las Empresas de Capital Multinacional en Areas de Integraci6n Econ6mica.
Serie Estudios No. 3 (1971). Las Inversiones Multinacionales en el Desarrollo y la
Integraci6n de America Latina (1968). El Tema de la Empresa Multinacional en una
Perspectiva Latinoamericana, con Referencia Especial a los Problemas Organizativos y
juridicos de este tipo de empresas. 32/DT.I. (1972). Empresas Multinacionales
Latinoamericanas. Estudio de los Aspectos Juridicos de la Asociaci6n Internacional de
Empresas en America Latina. INV-8/DT.1/Rev. 3 (1973).
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investment field. According to statistics assembled in an essay prepared by the United Nations, 9 by 1972, the total direct foreign investment in the world exceeded 165 thousand million United States dollars. Of this total investment, approximately sixty percent belonged to
United States owned enterprises and the balance belonged correspondingly to Great Britain, France, West Germany, Switzerland and Japan.
It is interesting to note that only two hundred companies were controlling seventy-five percent of all sales and international trade and that
these same companies also were in direct control of eighty-two percent
of all foreign branches and subsidiaries. The foregoing facts should
give us adequate notice that, unless this trend is oriented sufficiently,
the growth of these modern "goliaths" will be out of control within
the next few years.
The main problem stems from the fact that the TNE transcends
the traditional legal framework regarding the treatment of foreign
investments. This type of conglomerate has fewer attachments to any
given State and maintains various corporate headquarters while engaging in corporate activities within mutiple countries. Moreover, the
stockholdings in these conglomerates are of a multinational character.
It is not surprising, then, that the classical notions of private international law can no longer accommodate TNEs, for they are not the
typical foreign corporation doing business abroad, nor are they analogous to a foreign business branch licensed in accordance with the local
regulations of the host country. Hence, from a national and international point of view, the traditional legal treatment of foreign investment has become inadequate if not wholly obsolete. This new juridical.
phenomenon presents itself in such an unconventional manner that not
one stable precedent has been set, nor can a rule be established, for
measuring future cases. The complexity of the situation is furthered
when one considers a series of inherent problems that must be faced
concurrently. Some of those problems are the transfer of technology,
antitrust policies, restrictive commercial practices, the impact of the
balance of payments, and undue interference in internal political
matters.
In any event, when attempting to define a new legal framework
for TNEs, the question arises as to when and where the foreign
company becomes a transnational entity. When does the imbalance
take place to such a degree that domestic law is no longer applicable?
9. U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Multinational Corporation in World Development, ST/ECA/190 (1973). This document was a basic instrument
for the report to be submitted by the Group of Eminent Persons to ECOSOC.
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What elements would denote a company as a transnational company?
It could be that the volume of annual sales, the number of countries in
which business is transacted, or the origin of the investment would
provide guidelines to determine the moment at which a foreign
company becomes a TNE. Assuming that some of these guidelines
would help to identify a TNE, the appointing of a supranational entity
to classify it still would be necessary; yet, any definition would contain
subjective evaluations, gray area cases and periodical readjustments.
In spite of these seemingly insurmountable hurdles, the jurist
should strive to define and confine the features of TNEs. If not, all that
can be accomplished is mere speculation purely on theoretical
grounds. This article shall outline various possibilities aimed at establishing a legal framework for TNEs. The author shall attempt to focus
the juridical impact according to the viewpoint of scope and the use of
a proper legal instrument. The scope viewpoint will concentrate on the
space or territorial sphere of application, while the view point regarding the use of a proper legal instrument will focus on the methodology
to be implemented. Reference to territorial scope may be domestic,
bilateral or multilateral. Reference to the proper legal implementation
could range from national legislation to an effective international
treaty. To clarify these premises, the following schematic outline is
offered:
TERRITORIAL SCOPE

I. Internal

II.

Bilateral

III.

Multilateral 0

PROPER LEGAL METHOD

A.

National legislation of host
country.
B. National legislation of home
country.
A. Agreement between host country
and home country.
B. Agreement between host country
and TNE.
A. Uniform law.
B. Model or draft law.
C. Code of conduct.
D. International treaty.

In addition to the formal adoption of any of the foregoing patterns,
the control of TNEs could be implemented through the creation of a
center for research and information to provide administrative services
10. Within the multilateral approach the alternatives of universal, regional, and
subregional scope can be distinguished.
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in this field, or the creation of a commission on TNEs established
within the framework of an international organization.
I.

A.

THE INTERNAL SCOPE

National Legislation of Host Country

The legal treatment of foreign investment traditionally has been
regulated by national law. Until recently, such national regulations had
been oriented to govern the typical and traditional patterns concerning
the status of aliens and their right to do business abroad as individuals
or as corporate entities. The treatment afforded these aliens varied
according to the domestic climate. Some countries granted a recognized minimum standard, while others provided the aliens equal treatment with nationals and still others afforded similar status to foreigners, but subjected them to restrictions regarding certain segments of
their economic activity. These restrictions were usually concerned
with natural resources or the rendering of services deemed to be of
social interest.
In recent years, however, a change in national law can be detected. The legal status of foreigners does not seem to be of paramount
concern; it is the economic repercussions of their activity as private
investors that now matters most. The former policy of using direct
foreign investment as a vehicle for development, particularly in the
less developed countries, has now been supplemented or substituted by
more profound objectives regarding social responsibilities. This trend
is exemplified in the Exposition des Motifs of the new Mexican Law
Regulating Foreign Investment when it states that:
Foreign investment has been contributing during recent
years to our development, to supplementing domestic savings and, thus, to contributing to the gradual increase of the
gross national product. However, our economic objectives
are now subject to a different policy that not only aims to
increase our production or to reach industrialization at any
price. Our nation has decided to endeavor to achieve a balanced growth of the economic, social and cultural aspects of
its development and not to yield to the seduction of fictitious
mirages which may only lead to new forms of foreign dependence. i
11. The Exposition of Motives of the FIL (Exposicidn de Motivos de la Ley para
Promover la Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n Extrajera), Dec. 27, 1972. See
Law to Promote Mexican Investment and to Regulate Foreign Investment, (Ley Para
Promover La Inversion Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n Extranjera) in Official Daily of
Mexico (Diario Oficial) Mar. 9, 1973. The law became effective on May 9, 1973.
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A similar philosophy is the basis of recent legislation enacted by
Agentina, 12 Brazil, 13 Paraguay, 14 Uruguay 15 and the countries of the
Andean Group.16 In spite of the newness of this legislative policy
regarding direct private investment, none of the national laws that the
author has consulted deals with the specific regulation of TNEs. One
must assume that the TNE is but one of the entities defined by such
legislations under the terms of "foreign investor", "foreign capital",
or "foreign enterprise".
The primary question, then, is whether the internal domestic law
of the host country is sufficient to cope with the complexity of problems surrounding TNEs. An essay prepared by the Legal Department
of the Organization of American States (OAS), 7 points out that the
greatest obstacle to unilateral control under the host country's legislation is the fact that the TNE, by its very structure, can evade various
aspects of control merely by acting outside the scope of national
boundaries.
In spite of the disadvantages outlined above, it must be admitted
that the most effective legal control of TNEs is within the local
jurisdiction of the investment recipient country. Perhaps what is
needed is a more sophisticated level of legislation that would cover the
control of direct foreign investment by host countries; yet, even if such
12. Law No. 20557 on Foreign Establishments (Ley Namero 20557 sobre
Radicaciones Extranjeras) in Official Daily of Argentina (Diario Oficial), Nov. 29,
1973; Decree No. 413, in Official Daily of Argentina (Diario Oficial) Feb. 5, 1974.
13. Law No. 4131 as amended by Law No. 4390 and Decree No. 55762 (Ley
Ntimero 4131 reformada con la Ley Ntimero 4390 y Decreto No. 55762), in Official Daily
of Brazil (Diario Oficial) Sept. 3, 1962, Aug. 29, 1964, Feb. 18, 1965.
14. Law No. 216 Capital Investment for the Socioeconomic Development of the
Country (Ley Ndmero 216, Inversiones para el Desarrollo Econ6mico y Social) in
Official Daily of Paraguay (Diario Oficial) Nov. 9, 1970.
15. Law No. 14179, Norms for the Application of the Law on Foreign Investments
(Ley Namero 14179, Normas parala Aplicaci6n de la Ley de InversionesExtranjeras)in
Official Daily of Uruguay (DiarioOficial) Mar. 28, 1974. Decree No. 808/74 embodies in
one text all legal provisions including the amendment introduced by Law No. 14244
Regulating Foreign Investments in Uruguay. (Ley Ndmero 14244, Reglamento para
Inversiones Extranjeras) in Official Daily of Uruguay (DiarioOficial) Oct. 10, 1974.
16. Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents,
Licenses, and Royalties, Decision 24 (Rgimen Comain de Tratamiento a los Capitales
Extranjerosy Sobre Marcas, Patentes, Licencias y Regalas Decision 24), signed Dec.
31, 1970; 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 152 (1972). The text of Decision 24 incorporates the
amendments introduced by Decision 37 (June 24, 1971), Decision 37-A (July 17, 1971)
and Decision 70 (Feb. 13, 1973) of the Cartagena Agreement, infra note 28.
17. Organization of American States, The Legal Framework of the Transnational
Enterprises (El Marco Juridico de las Empresas Transnacionales) 45, OEA/SER.
K/XXI. CIDIP/2, (1973).
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legislation could be enacted into national law, the question remains as
to whether it could be applied extraterritorially. One solution might be
available through the interplay of conflict rules, whereby the courts of
one nation could apply the substantive law of the other nation. However, this alternative requires some form of international agreement
and this aspect shall be considered further infra.
B. National Legislation of Home Country
The unilateral control of TNEs may be two-fold. On the one
hand, national law is applied and controls the conduct of foreign
companies doing business within the political limits of the country. On
the other hand, national law also governs the activities of its own
companies doing business abroad. It must be assumed that this latter
type of control can only be exercised through a State's long-arm
powers, which are used to enforce its own law by subjecting the parent
corporation and, indirectly its subsidiaries and affiliates abroad, to
various measures of disciplinary action.
The basic problem of this type of extra-territorial legal power is
that it may clash with the sovereign rights of the host country. Examples of these frictions are seen in the repeated attempts to apply United
States antitrust law to acts abroad and in the enforcement of such
restrictive measures by subjecting foreign countries to economic embargo pursuant to United States public policy. In most of these cases,
the long-arm statute of the home country touches the sensitive area of
national sovereignity and, yet, the broad principle of home control
may be desirable. Consider the hearings and investigations conducfed
by the sub-Committee on Multinational Corporations within the United
States Senate. Information and corruptive practices of some TNEs are
disclosed and this could lead to a more effective domestic control and
could impede the TNE from actions which could embarrass their own
government and tarnish its image in world trade competition.
Similarly, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission
recently has adopted severe measures aimed at curbing improper contributions and pay-offs to foreign officials. This enables the ordinary
citizen to gain some concrete knowledge of the extent to which United
States multinational companies are involved in government corruption
within developing countries. The Securities and Exchange Commission has the discretion 8 to conduct investigations into possible violations of the Securities and Exchange Act and to bring actions to enjoin
18. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1934).
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such violations. In addition, provisions contained in the United States
Internal Revenue Code 19 provide a deterrent to illicit foreign practices,
in that any business deduction for payments made to officials or
employees of foreign countries is denied.
The foregoing is indicative of a positive trend because the great
majority of TNEs have their home headquarters in the United States
and, thus, are subject to compliance with United States domestic law.
Transgression of such law exposes the TNE to the possibility of worldwide scandal which makes the desireability of unilateral legal control
sound even more convincing.
II.

A.

THE BILATERAL SCOPE

Agreement Between Host Country and Home Country

This course of action may occur through the cooperative efforts of
the foreign country where the TNE conducts a portion of its operations
and the home-nation of the TNE. Such cooperation may result in a
bilateral agreement which could be an adequate instrument to solve
some of the problems where unilateral action does not suffice. Hence,
matters affecting double taxation, dual nationality of corporations,
problems arising out of the operation of airlines and other craft in both
countries, could be covered by a bilateral treaty. The treaty also could
provide such mechanisms for solving possible disputes between the
two countries, as arbitration forums, buffer safeguards and enforcement of money judgments or arbitral awards.
Regardless of the possible benefits of this bilateral system, it
would not be the best answer to the problems regarding TNEs. In the
first place, TNEs operating in several countries would have to abide by
a different treaty in each country. Because every host country has
singular peculiarities, the negotiating of conditions for a different
treaty in every case could prove troublesome indeed for the home
country. Concessions based on most-favored-nation clauses, the adoption of paternalistic attitudes toward less developed countries, and the
possibility of agreements that do not reflect arms length negotiations
are but a few of the obstacles that must be considered. Additionally, it
is entirely possible that recipient nations would be suspicious of the
undue influence that TNEs could exert upon their own government
which would subrogate the high principles of the State to the private
interests of the enterprise.
In summary, it is submitted that the bilateral approach as an
19. I.R.C. § 162(c).
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alternative avenue for the control of TNEs could be effective only if
entered into by countries that are experiencing similar stages of
economic development. In other words, both countries should be
either "exporters" of TNEs or belong to the less developed world.
B.

Agreement Between Host Country and TNE

Before embarking on an evaluation of this method, one principle
should be established. TNEs or multinational corporations are not
recognized as "persons" under international law and, thus, they lack
jus standi in international courts. Nevertheless, the fact remains that
many TNEs do negotiate and enter into agreements with the governments of the countries wherein they plan to invest. Several developing
countries are of the opinion that their economies need foreign capital
and that they should open their doors to transnational conglomerates.
Their bargaining power vis a vis these giants is commensurate with
their own resources, native technology and managerial expertise. It is
obvious, then, that the less developed the host country, the weaker is
its negotiating position. Therefore, it should not be surprising that
third-world countries accept the terms and conditions imposed by the
TNE. After all, the TNE has the power and means to develop untouched natural resources, to create badly needed jobs, and to improve, at
least temporarily, the image of local government. Some of these terms
are agreed upon in bilateral conventions or "treaties" and have not
been an unusual occurrance even when socialistic countries of Eastern
Europe have dealt with Western industrial giants in the automotive
field.
Legal advisors of TNEs feel that many of the problems attributed
to them could be avoided if a clear understanding of the rules of the
game were established at the inception of the agreement. Pursuant to
this school of thought, matters involving jurisdiction, taxation, licensing, transfer pricing, expropriation and other sensitive areas could be
dealt with by an agreement between the government of the host
country and the top management of the TNE. Notwithstanding these
arguments, developing states should refrain from entering into this
type of agreement for it may grant TNEs direct access to international
courts, including arbitration courts. In addition, the foregoing situation
would place TNEs in an advantageous position over national enterprises. The TNEs' claims could be heard eventually by international
tribunals because of the bilateral agreements entered into by the states
of host and home countries. Such claims, however, could not be heard
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by international tribunals as the exercise of a contractual right demanded by a private corporation.
III.

THE MULTILATERAL APPROACH

A. The Scope
The Report of the Group of Eminent Persons2" to study the Role
of Multinational Corporations on Development and on International
Relations addressed to the Secretary General of the Economic and
Social Counsel, states that the group considers the conclusion of a
general agreement on the subject of TNEs an appropiate long term
objective. Such an agreement would have the force of an international
treaty and would contain the necessary provisions for machinery and
sanctions. The group further advised that the need for such an agreement had been perceived as early as 1948 in the drafting of the Havana
Charter for an International Trade Organization.
The Group of Eminent Persons admitted, however, that it is still
premature to propose serious negotiations on such an agreement and
for the machinery necessary to implement its mandatory enforcement.
The Report emphazised that, while the primary responsibility for
taking action rests with individual governments, national measures
will be ineffective and frustrated unless they are accompanied by
cooperative action at the international level. Therefore, the Group
recommended:
that a commission on multinational corporations should be
established under the Economic and Social Council,
composed of individuals with a profound understanding of
the issues and problems involved. 2
This alternative of subjecting the control of multinational corporations to International Law, even if one concedes that it is premature at
the present stage, offers distinctive advantages. The apparent failure of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to prevent
restrictive practices in international trade, linked with the TNEs resistance to be permanently tied to their home countries in order that they
may enjoy a convenient "statelessness" which allows them more
freedom of action, constitutes valid reasons for advocating supranational supervision. Moreover, the fact that TNEs are subject to various
laws, such as those of the country where the parent company is
domiciled and those laws governing the business of each subsidiary
and affiliate, could be an additional argument for international regula20. 13 INT'L. LEGAL MATERIALS 833 (1974).
21. Id. at 831.
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tion of TNEs. The fact remains that, in spite of an interplay of multiple
national laws, the TNE as a whole is not subject to the control of any
specific legislation. Therefore, some sort of multilateral action would
seem appropiate and could be made at the different levels of universal
agreement, regional agreement, or sub-regional agreement.
1. Universalagreement. Regarding universal or quasi-universal agreements concerning the legal regulation of TNEs, such should
be negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations using the
information and materials assembled by the Commission on Transnational Corporations. Obviously, the Commission should rely on information provided by the Information and Research Centre, and not
overlook the work of other specialized agencies within the United
Nations, in addition to information gathered from other scientific
organizations and forums of international prestige. It should be pointed
out that, in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, it is
provided that the state has the right
to regulate and supervise the activities of transnational
corporations within its national jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such activities comply with its laws, rules
and regulations and conform to its economic and social
policies.22
The Charter also provides that TNE's should not interfere in the
internal affairs of the host country and that every state should, taking
fully into account its sovereign rights, cooperate with other states in
23
the exercise of such privilege.
The guidelines established by the Charter constitute a landmark in
the progressive codification of international law. The negative votes
and the abstentions of some of the industrialized countries when the
final text of this instrument was voted at the General Assembly of the
United Nations, should be construed as a defense against other provisions contained in the Charter and not as a rejection of the right of the
state to supervise the activities of the TNE within its jurisdiction. It
seems that the objections of the industrialized countries were directed
primarily against the text of sub-section (c), which dealt with the duty
of the state, in cases of expropriation, to pay the aggrieved party an
"appropriate" compensation. The Charter provides that such compensation shall be paid in accordance with national law and not necessarily
pursuant to the traditional concepts of international law.
22. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (CERDS), G.A. Res. 3281, 29
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
23. Id. ch. II, art. 2, § 2(b).
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Therefore, it is hoped that when minor amendments are introduced to this instrument for the purpose of eliminating the remaining misunderstandings, the charter will be unanimously approved by
all members of the United Nations and every state's right to regulate
and oversee the activities of TNEs within its national jurisdiction will
be accepted automatically.
2. Regional agreement. Experience already observed at a regional level may prove useful in establishing multilateral control of
TNEs. Countries within a particular area have adopted certain mechanisms for the purpose of self defense. The coincidental interests of the
economies of certain countries have resulted in uniform trends toward
the safeguarding of regional areas against the challenge of multinational entities.
The best example of regional control is found in the European
Economic Communities (EEC) where some of the provisions
contained in the Treaty of Rome, 24 particularly those regulating the
rules on competition, were implemented through the organization.
According to the Treaty, when the activity of one or more enterprises
affects trade between member states, or when it restricts competition,
or when any company abuses a dominant position within the common
market, the commission is empowered to take the appropriate action to
correct such activity. The European communities have met these
problems by adopting antitrust policies and other mechanisms aimed at
protecting free competition and trade.
However, during the last ten years the governing bodies of the
EEC have become acutely aware of the growing presence of nonEuropean enterprises within the community and a new plan is taking
shape. Measures have been adopted to strengthen the competitive
capabilities of regional enterprises. Pursuant to this new policy, the
EEC has been initiating the mergers of European companies even if
such mergers may appear to conflict with articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty of Rome and even though the mergers sometimes occur with
extra-regional entities. The sponsoring of holding companies and the
formal structuring of the European company also can be viewed as
mechanisms of self defense adopted by the community.
Other examples of regional economic integration are the Latin
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) and the Central American
Common Market (CACM). These two systems form the foundation for
24. Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, art. 85, 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 68, 69.
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the creation of the Latin American Common Market. However, neither
the Montevideo Treaty, 25 nor the Tegucigalpa Treaty, 26 contain any
specific reference to the legal treatment of direct foreign investment
within free trade areas. In the Declaration of Punta del Este, 27 the
Presidents of Latin America recognized that foreign private enterprise
should fulfill an important function in achieving the objectives of Latin
American integration. Aside from the worthwhile research and efforts
conducted by the Instituto para la Integraci6n de Amirica Latina
(INTAL), the only positive contribution in the area of integration is
found in the legal instruments supporting the Andean Pact, that is the
Cartagena Agreement and the decisions adopted by its commission
28
thus far.
3. Sub-regional agreement. Pursuant to the provisions of articles 27 and 28 of the Cartagena Agreement, 29 the commission approved two important decisions, numbered twenty-four and forty-six,
which established a common system for the treatment of foreign
capital and a uniform system to govern multinational enterprises.
Decision twenty-four 3" has as its fundamental objective the strengthen25. Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American Free
Trade Association, signed at Montevideo, Uruguay, Feb. 18, 1960, 1 INTER-AMERICAN
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 3 (1975).

26. Multilateral Treaty of Free Trade and Central American Economic Integration,
signed at Tegucigalpa, Honduras, June 10, 1958, 2 INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA
AND THE CARIBBEAN 365 (1975).

27. Declaration of the Presidents of America, signed at Punta del Este, Uruguay,
Apr. 14, 1967, I INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 165 (1975).
28. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, Cartagena Agreement, signed
at Bogoti, Colombia, May 26, 1969, 1 INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE

CARIBBEAN

175 (1975); 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 910 (1969). This Agreement was

originally signed by Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, and Peri. Venezuela acceded to
it in the Final Act of The Negotiations Between The Commission of The Cartagena
Agreement And The Government of Venezuela For The Adherence of That Country to
The Agreement, done at Lima, Per6, Feb. 13, 1973, 1 INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL

LEGAL STUDIES,

INSTRUMENTS

219 (1975); 12

OF ECONOMIC

INTEGRATION IN LATIN

(1973).
29. Id.
30. Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents,
Licenses and Royalties, Decision 24, (Rigimen Comin de Tratamiento a los Capitales
Extranjeros y Sobre Marcas, Patentes, Licencias y Regalias, Decisi6n 24, signed Dec.
31, 1970, 1 INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 296 (1975); 11
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 126 (1972).
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 344
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ing of national enterprises and the regulation of foreign investment
activities within the countries of the sub-region, in such a manner that
they may contribute toward the goals of national development. The
common regime defines what could be construed as a "foreign investor", "foreign enterprise" and "mixed enterprise", but it does not
contain any specific reference to TNEs. One must assume that the
concept of TNE is embodied within the more generic concept of
"foreign enterprise".31

Decision forty-six 32 does not contain the definition of "multinational enterprise". Nevertheless, one may infer through the provisions
set forth in chapters two, three and four, that such enterprises are
envisaged as vehicles for organizing sub-regional investors and oriented to foster projects for specific industries and to develop infrastructural resources. They should be established in the form of stock
companies, and their bylaws-should comply with the legislation of the
country where the principal domicile exists.
Notwithstanding the semantic resemblance, multinational enterprises within the context of the Cartagena Agreement are not to be
confused with TNEs. They are, in fact, counterparts. Some of these
enterprises are already operating within the country members of the
Andean Pact, and other "Latin American multinationals" outside of
the Andean countries, have started to spread. A typical example is the
Empresa Multinacional Naviera del Caribe, which is presently
operating under the auspices of the governments of Mexico and several
Caribbean nations.
B.

The Method

1. Uniform Law. One alternative within the methodology of
multilateral control would be to unify the substantive law governing
TNEs. Such a unification should aim for the attainment of a uniform
set of substantive rules in the field; an exercise which may prove more
difficult than assembling a cohesive code of conflict rules.
31. Id. art. 1, of the Common Regime defines foreign enterprise as follows:
An enterprise whose capital in the hands of national investors to less than 51%
or, if that percentage is higher, it is not reflected, in the opinion of the proper
national authority, in the technical, financial, administrative, and commercial
management of the enterprise.
32. Uniform Regime on Multinational Enterprises and Regulations of the Treatment Applicable to Sub-regional Capital, Decision 46 of the Commission, Dec. 18, 1971,
as amended, I INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUMENTS OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 326 (1975), I1

INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 357 (1972).
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Nevertheless, when pursuing this technique, the contracting parties must endeavor to reach a consensus on material issues for a
uniform law is the ultimate goal. Legal uniformity normally is the
result of lengthy negotiations carried out at a plenipontentiary conference. The final text, in such a situation, follows the orthodox course of
multilateral agreements regarding signatures, ratification, effectiveness and accession by other states. The ultimate purpose of uniformity
is achieved when each of the contracting parties incorporates the
uniform text into their national legislation through their local constitutional procedures. This should be done without altering the intrinsic
contents of the unified law unless, of course, the convention had been
ratified subject to certain reservations imposed by internal public
policy.
The unification and harmonization of the rules governing TNEs
may prove to be a more hazardous process than attempts to unify other
fields of international law. The significant success reached in such
matters regarding the international sale of goods, maritime transportation and commercial arbitration is well known, but attempts at unification of norms relating to transnational conduct is a task surrounded by
complex conceptual issues as well as deep emotional feelings.
The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) has expended worthwhile efforts in this direction. The
fact that UNIDROIT has made recommendations to the International
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) in connection with the unification or
harmonization of laws governing business associations is common
knowledge. Such recommendations enabled the ICC to publish a
practical guide describing the best method for incorporating companies
with multinational purposes. Notwithstanding their efforts, it is only
recently that UNIDROIT has been one of the forums where the issue of
TNEs has been discussed.
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) has included the subject of TNEs on its pending agenda.
During the work session in Geneva, in April of 1973, a resolution was
adopted which sought the collaboration of the United Nations' General
Secretary for the purpose of gathering relevant information on the
juridical problems affecting TNEs and to determine the best method
for the unification and harmonization of international commercial
law." The author is unaware as to whether the Secretary General of the
33.

G.A. Res. 205, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 99, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
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United Nations has received answers to the questionnaire posed to each
of the member states and if any such answers have been referred to
UNCITRAL for further action.
It seems, however, that some of the initiatives taken by several
specialized agencies of the United Nations, prior to ECOSOC Resolution 1913,11 which established the Commission on Transnational
Corporations, will now be held in abeyance. This is so at least until
recommendations are made by the commission which is now the
official forum within the United Nations for comprehensive consideration of issues relating to TNEs.
2. Model or draft law. Some decades ago, under the auspices
of institutes of scientific research, or universities of renowned prestige, it was vogue to prepare "model laws" or "draft conventions".
Although these drafts and models rarely materialized into international
instruments, they did establish guidelines of progressive thought pertaining to different fields of law. These drafts actually stated the better
principles upon which future multilateral law should rest.
Unlike uniform law, model or draft law is not designed for
eventual adoption as a domestic rule of law. Rather, it carries scientific
or doctrinaire persuasion and, therefore, may or may not be followed.
Each state decides whether to integrate it into its domestic legislation
or whether to adopt alternatives within the suggested model.
International and regional organizations, such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States, could outline basic
guidelines regulating foreign investment within their member countries
highlighting the philosophy or rationale supporting the rules. Such
ideal guidelines would be inspirational for those governments that are
confronting the problems of foreign capital, but are, nevertheless, still
lagging in the task of enacting proper regulations.
3. Code of conduct. For some time there has been much talk
within the various international forums regarding a "code of
conduct". That such a code should contain a set of rules governing the
behavior of TNEs is agreed upon, but no agreement as to the binding nature of such a code has been reached. The less developed
countries, who are the recipients of investments made by the industrialized nations, would like to see those rules made mandatory, while
34. ECOSOC Res. 1913, 57 U.N. ESCOR (Supp. IA) 3, U.N. Doc. E/5570/add. 1
(1975).
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the latter agree only to regard the code as a self-imposed set of
principles or ethical guidelines.
The Report of Eminent Persons points out that the term "code"
itself is full of ambiguity. A code may represent the consolidation into
one document those laws, decrees and rules which are already adopted
and enforced. Mere "declaration of principles", however, that simply
states the moral guidelines to which TNEs should subject themselves
voluntarily, does not seem an adequate answer. The problems involved
are too varied and complex to be solved entirely by self-discipline. A
middle-ground that lies somewhere between an instrument of a
compulsory character and a set of rules of mere ethical persuasion
should be sought.
Such a compromise could be found if a proper forum, such as
the Commission on Transnational Corporations of the ECOSOC,
evolved a set of recommendations, which would represent the basis for
a code of conduct in this matter. The commission received and studied
lists submitted by the less developed countries and, also, by the
industrialized nations. These lists reflected the countries' concerns in
this area of TNEs. The commission was required under ECOSOC
Resolution 1913 to submit a detailed program of work concerning
transnational corporations to the council in the summer of 1976. The
commission met twice, once in March of 1975 and once in March of
1976. Its first task of designing a program to be submitted to the
ECOSOC has been properly concluded.
Other forums also are working on a code of conduct. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has
agreed on the text for a conduct code. 35 The document spells out rules
for corporate behavior on issues ranging from bribery to restrictive
business practices and disclosure of information. In the western hemisphere, the working group, which was established in 1974 as a result
of the "new dialogue", submitted an aide memoire36 which contains
ten guidelines for insuring the "good conduct" of TNEs. The
commandments stress, inter alia, the obligation of consortiums to
35. The twenty-four member countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) agreed on the text by declaration on June 21, 1976. N.Y.
Times, June 22, 1976, § I, at 49, col. 6. Excerpts from the text on the Code of Conduct
were published in the N.Y. Times, May 27, 1976, § I, at 6, col. i.
36. BANCO NACIONAL DE COMERCIO, S.A., COMERcIo EXTERIOR DE MEXICO, Vol.
XXV, No. 4, Apr. 1975, at 376. For the English text of the 10 guidelines for conduct as
prepared by the Working Group (Latin American), see Organization of American States,
Opinion of the Inter-American Juridical Committee on Transnational Enterprises,
OEA/Ser. G./ CP/Inf. 829/76, at 17 (1976).
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submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts within the host
country, noninterference in the host country's internal affairs,
compliance with the objectives of national development, disclosure of
pertinent information about activities, avoidance of all kinds of restrictive practices, and respect accorded to the social and cultural identity
of the host country.
The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States
has recently adopted its own resolution. This resolution takes into
account the work being done in the Inter-American Juridical Committee (IJC) which stresses continued endeavors toward the formulation of
37
a code of conduct to be observed by TNEs. In a more recent opinion,
the IJC concluded that the American states should cooperate among
themselves regarding TNEs. Such cooperation should be regarded as a
priority objective, in both the formulation of general rules and the
examination and settlement of disputes.
The feasibility of adopting a code of conduct, that would unify the
criteria of all groups concerned on a short term basis, is not foreseeable. The areas of concern and the nature of the instrument are viewed
from entirely different angles. Hopefully, however, these divergencies
gradually shall vanish and, in the near future, a consensus or compromise shall be reached among the nations of the world.
4. International treaty. The negotiation of a general agreement on TNEs, although ambitious, is not entirely unrealistic. Various
international treaties exist that deal with foreign commercial
companies at universal and regional levels. International codification
has covered such legal aspects as recognizing corporations, doing
business abroad, jus standi in domestic courts, and requirements
concerning licensing and local registration.
Thus, harmonization of the law in this area also can be accomplished through a multilateral convention. Moreover, as a technical
devise, a treaty possibly could be the optimum solution to this problem. Professor Eugene V. Rostow believes that
the successful negotiation of an international treaty which
could facilitate a massive movement of capital and of business from the industrialized to the developing nations,
through "multinational" companies, is among the most ur38
gent tasks of diplomacy.
37. OEAISer. G./CP/lnf. 829176, at 124 (1976).
38. Rubin, Reflections Concerning the United Nations Commission on Transnational Enterprises, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 73 (1976).
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Although the attainment of universal or quasi-universal agreement on
this matter may take a long time, it is not unlikely that states within a
regional area that have common attitudes toward foreign investment,
and similar economic objectives, could agree on an international treaty
concerning the treatment to be accorded TNEs. The method to be
pursued, however, is a matter of time and space.
IV.

MECHANISM To IMPLEMENT INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF TNE's

A. InternationalCommission
When the Group of Eminent Persons submitted its report to the
ECOSOC, no international machinery dealing with the activities of
TNEs existed. After examining the functions and responsibilities
vested in the United Nations39 the group concluded that ECOSOC was
the appropriate body to consider the subject. Thus, the group recommended "that a commission on multinational corporations should be
established" under the auspices of the council.
On December 5, 1974, ECOSOC decided in Resolution 19134 to
establish an inter-governmental commission on transnational corporations. The commission was charged with advising and assisting the
council in dealing with issues relating to TNEs. The commission is
composed of forty-eight members selected from "all states" or "on
[a] broad and fair geographic basis." The geographic distribution is
reflected in the following manner: Africa, 12 members; Asia, 11;
Latin America, 10; the Socialist States of Eastern Europe, 5; Western
Europe and others, which includes the United States, Canada, and
Australia, 10. Commission members are elected for a three year term.
The Resolution requested that the commission submit to
ECOSOC at its sixtieth session,
a detailed draft programme of work on the full range of
issues relating to transnational corporations, including a
statement of its proposed priorities within the framework of
the following guidelines: the development of a comprehensive information system; preliminary work with the objective of formulating a code of conduct; the undertaking of
studies, especially case studies, on the political economic
and social impact of the operation and practices of transnational corporations which seem most urgent; and the definition of TNEs. The draft programme should be without preju39.
40.
(1975).

U.N. CHARTER, ch. 9, 10.
ECOSOC Res. 1913, 57 U.N. ESCOR, (Supp. IA) 3, U.N. Doc. E/5570/add. 1
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dice to the work undertaken within the UN system in related
fields .41
B.

Information and Research Centre

Following another recommendation made by the Group of Eminent Persons, ECOSOC established an Information and Research
Centre. 42 (IRC) The IRC was charged with the task of developing a
comprehensive information system on the activities of TNEs. This was
to be done by gathering available information from governments and
other sources. After an analysis' of such information, it should be
disseminated to the Commission on Transnational Corporations. The
IRC also should conduct research on the political, legal, economic and
social aspects of TNEs with the aim of strengthening the capacity of
host countries, particularly developing countries, to deal with transnational corporations. Other duties were assigned to the IRC by the
commission and among those duties was the charge to conduct "a
comparative study of existing international codes of conduct" and of
"existing national and regional legislation and regulations enacted
with the purpose of regulating the operations and activities of
43
TNEs.
V.

PERSPECTIVE AND CONCLUSIONS

During the last several years debate on the issue of TNE's has
gained considerable momentum. Governments of home countries, who
first refused to assign the role of villain to TNEs, now are anxious to
keep them "at bay" regarding irregular practices. Disclosures of
political interference, questionable payments to foreign officials and
involvement in corruption have been emerging as surely as the evils of
Pandora's box. One scandal after another has kept the TNEs in the
headlines as well as in the minds of statesmen and the "man on the
street". The general consensus seems to be that "something ought to
be done" to regulate the conduct of TNEs.
Yet, the TNE, per se, cannot be labeled as good or bad, saint or
demon. If properly controlled, it can function as an effective vehicle
for development, but if uncontrolled, it has the potential of becoming a
subversive instrument of domination and greed. Fortunately, mutilateral and national action currently is under way with the purpose
41. Id.
42. ECOSOC Res. 1908, 57 U.N. ESCOR, (Supp. 1) 13, U.N. Doc. E/5570 (1974).
43. Commission on Transnational Corporation, 57 U.N. ESCOR, (Supp. 12, U.N.
Doc. E/5655, E/C.10/6., para. 11 (1975).
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subjecting lucrative private interests to the higher objectives of international cooperation and justly shared development.
To conclude, the TNE should be subject to legal regulation and
juridical control can be exercised following diverse scope and methodology. It would seem that national legislation of the host country is
presently the most effective method for controlling TNEs. However,
one must not overlook the home country's own laws as an effective
deterrent to irregular practices. International regulation, at universal,
regional and sub-regional levels, while still a long-term objective,
affords distinctive advantages over domestic legislation.
The unification and harmonization of laws pertaining to TNEs
should be reached gradually by utilizing the efforts presently conducted within various international forums. In spite of disagreements
regarding the mandatory nature of the code of conduct to govern these
consortiums, partial agreement is being reached on restrained general
guidelines and within limited areas. The work undertaken by the
Commission on Transnational Corporations and the Information and
Research Centre of the ECOSOC is laying the foundation and initial
structure of a more complete framework to be achieved in future years.
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